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Abstract—The last decade has experienced a vast interest in
Blockchain-based cryptocurrencies with a specific focus on the
applications of this technology. However, slow confirmation times
of transactions and unforeseeable high fees hamper their wide
adoption for micro-payments. The idea of establishing payment
channel networks is one of the many proposed solutions to
address this scalability issue where nodes, by utilizing smart
contracting, establish payment channels between each other and
perform off-chain transactions. However, due to the way these
channels are created, both sides have a certain one-way capacity
for making transactions. Consequently, if one sides exceeds this
one-way capacity, the channel becomes useless in that particular
direction, which causes failures of payments and eventually
creates an imbalance in the overall network. To keep the payment
channel network sustainable, in this paper, we aim to increase the
overall success rate of payments by effectively exploiting the fact
that end-users are usually connected to the network at multiple
points (i.e., gateways) any of which can be used to initiate the
payment. We propose an efficient method for selection of the
gateway for a user by considering the gateway’s inbound and
outbound payment traffic ratio. We then augment this proposed
method with split payment capability to further increase success
rate especially for large transactions. The evaluation of the
proposed method shows that compared to greedy and maxflow-
based approaches, we can achieve much higher success rates,
which are further improved with split payments.
Index Terms—Bitcoin, Blockchain, Payment channel network,
Routing, Lightning Network
I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptocurrency, a path-breaking invention for the storage
and transfer of assets, is one of the most influential technolo-
gies of 2010s [1]. The intriguing idea behind it is storing
the ownership of the entities in an append-only, tamper-
proof database which is known as Blockchain. Although
Blockchain is being used in various applications [2], Bitcoin
is the first practical and widely accepted use case. Consensus
mechanism (i.e., Proof of Work (PoW)) used in Blockchains
eliminates the necessity of a central authority to approve
and keep the records. This enables making transactions in
a trustless environment. Blockchain is also irreversible and
publicly available, so all the participants have the copy of the
data, thus, the system is resilient against node failures and
malicious acts. Therefore, it also solves the single point of
failure problem and removes dependency on the trusted third
parties for transactions.
Even though the concept of a virtual currency is a brilliant
idea with a promising architecture, it still suffers from lack
of wide adoption due to its impracticality in day-to-day
micro-payments stemming from two main factors; 1) high
transaction fees and; 2) long block confirmation times. For
instance, in Bitcoin it takes 10 minutes to approve a block
of transactions. Furthermore, to prevent double spending, as a
rule of thumb, the merchants wait for approval of 6 consecutive
blocks. Additionally, the size of a block is limited to 4 MB
which not only hinders the possibility of an approval of a
payment on a congested day but also limits the total number
of transactions in a unit time. The theoretical maximum in
Bitcoin is calculated to be 7 transactions per second [7] which
is far lower than what Visa or MasterCard can process [8]. The
energy spent by the miners is another factor in the valuation
of the transaction fees [9].
There has been some recent attempts to address these issues.
Payment channel network (also known as off-chain transaction
networks) concept [10], [12] is among the proposed solutions.
The idea is to utilize smart-contracts and avoid writing every
transaction on the blockchain. Instead, the transactions are
recorded off-chain until the accounts are reconciled. Specif-
ically, once a channel is created between two peers, many
transactions can be performed in both directions as long as
there is enough funds. When many nodes come together, the
off-chain transaction channels turn into a network of payment
channels. Instead of opening a direct channel, a peer makes
use of an already established channel to forward money over
existing nodes by paying a transaction fee as long as a path
exists from the payer to the payee. This also helps in reducing
channel opening costs for a user since existing channels can be
utilized. Lightning Network (LN) is a perfect example of this
concept that has reached to almost 10K users in 2 years [10]
for Bitcoin transactions. This payment network has specific
nodes which charge transaction fees to users for passing their
data over these nodes. Basically, a user connects to a gateway
node, which is further connected to routing nodes that act as
the network backbone. Ultimately, LN achieves almost real-
time transactions with negligible fees compared to Bitcoin fees
and transaction validation times.
Nevertheless, payment channel networks, including LN,
come with their own challenges due to the way the channel
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capacities are consumed. Basically, if there is not enough
available capacity on a channel, the transactions cannot be
sent. More specifically, the channels are bi-directional and
when they are created, each peer’s (say A and B) one-
way capacity is set independently. As a result, a channel’s
capacity in one direction (i.e., from A to B) can be totally
consumed while the capacity in the opposite direction (i.e.,
from B to A) holds all of the funds. This means, while
one of the peers, B, can make transactions in one direction,
the other peer, A, cannot make any transactions through the
channel. To be able to send transactions again, A needs to
receive payments from B so that it can increase its channel
capacity. Due to this feature, insufficient funds in one-way
channels drastically drops the chance of payment transfers
in the network. One of the recent studies performed on LN
[10], the most prominent implementation of this concept,
indicates that chance of sending a $5 payment successfully is
around 50% which makes it practically useless for end-users.
Therefore, there is a need to address this issue to be able to
increase the success rate of transactions in payment channel
networks. To this end, we propose modifying the payment
route selection in payment channel networks.
Before explaining the rationale of our approach, we would
like to describe current LN’s approach to routing of payments.
LN advocates a self management and free market model. Node
operators are responsible to set the fee, select the connections,
and find the path to send the payment. Thus, transaction fee is
one of the major factors for end-users when choosing a route.
Therefore, the users tend to route their payments through the
cheapest path. We refer to this approach as greedy method
since it focuses on minimum fee and represents a selfish
approach. Obviously, this approach will not help in balancing
the channels since their capacities should be accounted when
finding the paths. Therefore, a potential solution would be
to compute maximum flow from a source to destination and
leaving the fee as a secondary factor. However, this flow
maximization needs to consider the whole network to come
up with a more balanced approach.
Therefore, in this paper, we propose a new routing approach
named gateway inbound/outbound ratio which calculates the
ratio of total inbound capacity to outbound capacity of each
connected gateway and chooses the minimum among these.
The insight that leads us to this method is that the bottleneck in
payment channel networks is the gateways where the payments
are initiated from or destined to the users. Routing nodes that
constitute the backbone of the payment network are naturally
being balanced since they transmit high number of transactions
in both ways. However, gateway nodes need to be taken care
of explicitly.
To further increase the success rate, we then focuse on split
payments, where a payment can be divided into pieces and
sent independently so that channel capacity variations will not
be major. We looked into two different split approaches; equal
share which distributes the total amount among the gateways,
and proportional split which assigns the payments to gateways
based on their inbound outbound ratios.
We implemented and tested the effectiveness of the pro-
posed approaches under various payment scenarios and ob-
served that the success rate can be significantly improved
with proper gateway selection and proportional split payment.
It creates symmetrically balanced channels and improve the
efficiency of the payment channel networks.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II summarizes
the related work in the literature while Section III provides
some background explaining the concepts used in payment
networks and our assumptions. Section IV presents the prob-
lem definition and our approach. In Section V, we assess the
performance of the proposed mechanism. Finally, Section VI
concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Various methods for the realization of the payment channel
network idea have been suggested and some are already
being implemented. LN [10] for Bitcoin and Raiden [12]
for Ethereum are two examples in practice. LN is the most
active one with more than 10,000 nodes and 30,000 channels
[15]. LN utilizes source-routing for transferring payments. The
node first discovers a path with available channel capacity,
then initiates the transaction. Spider [13] applies packet-
switching routing techniques to payment channel networks.
The payments are split into micro-payments similar to max-
imum transmission unit (MTU) in computer networks. It
uses congestion control and a best-effort model to improve
payment throughput. It specifically chooses the paths that re-
balances the channels. The payments are queued at spider
routers and they are transferred when the fund is available.
Flash [14] applies a distributed routing algorithm to better
handle constantly changing balances. It differentiates mice and
elephant payments. Small payments are sent randomly over
pre-computed paths. For large payments, it probes the nodes
to find the channel with available funds. Then it splits the
payment into several smaller chunks. Revive [16] assumes that
a node has multiple connections and the skewed payments
make some of the links depleted. It tries to find cycles in
the network and a user sends a payment to herself to re-
balance the depleted channel through others. SpeedyMurmur
[19] is focusing on the privacy of the payments by using an
embedding-based routing algorithm. SilentWhisper [18] and
Flare [17] are using landmark routing in which only some
nodes store routing tables for the complete network. The rest
only knows how to reach to one of those landmark nodes. A
user transmits the payment to the gateway node which handles
the rest. Our work in this paper focuses on path selection
strategies to choose the appropriate route for payments so
that the overall network will be more sustainable (i.e., more
successful transactions). In this regard, we explore the gateway
selection strategy which has a great impact on the overall
success of payment channel networks. This topic was not well
in those works as they mostly focus on routing mechanisms.
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III. PRELIMINARIES AND ASSUMPTIONS
A. Blockchain and Bitcoin
Blockchain is a distributed database in which the building
data structure is called a “block”. For Bitcoin, a block is
simply comprised of transactions (data), timestamp, nonce, the
hash of the block and the hash of the previous block [3]. In
cryptocurrency-based networks, the nodes come to a consensus
for the approval of a block by proving that they have enough
interest in the network. For instance in Bitcoin, Hashcash
proof-of-work (PoW) mechanism is utilized. In order for a
block to be accepted as valid, the hash of the block should
be smaller than a number which is decided by considering the
total accumulated computational power in the entire network.
By changing the nonce value in the block the miner aims to
find a suitable hash result. Soon after a valid block is found, it
gets distributed in the network. After the other nodes validate
that block, the next block calculation starts.
B. Off-Chain Payment Channels
For Bitcoin, the average time spent for the approval of
a block is 10 minutes. This duration casts suspicion on the
usability and practicality of the Bitcoin. More precisely, using
Bitcoin for day-to-day spending becomes almost impossible.
The reason for that is a payee waits at least 6 blocks to count
a transaction to be valid. So, for example, if one buys a cup
of coffee and uses Bitcoin to pay, s/he has to wait at least
one hour for the payment to get cleared. Moreover, during the
congested times, s/he has to either pay a lot of transaction
fees, possibly greater than the price of the coffee or has to
wait much more than the anticipated time. Apparently, this is
an undesirable case not only for a customer but also for a shop
owner.
To solve that problem, developers came up with the concept
of a mechanism called “off-chain payment channel” that
leverages the smart contract mechanism in blockchain. In that
concept, two users, say A and B, come to a mutual agreement
on establishing a business. Then they sign a contract by trans-
ferring collateral to a shared 2-of-2 multi-signature address
and initiate the channel by publishing it on the blockchain.
This contract type is called “Hash Time Locked Contracts”
(HTLC). When the users agree on any amount of payment,
they prepare a new HTLC, exchange the new contract, and
update the state of the channel. To initiate a payment from a
payer, a challenge, namely, a pre-image is sent to the recipient.
If the recipient can reply successfully to the challenge, the
contract becomes valid, and the ownership of the money gets
transferred. Off-chain mechanism brings a huge advantage
since the peers do not need to publish every transaction
on the blockchain. That is, the payments are theoretically
instantaneous. Moreover, as there is no need for frequent on-
chain transactions, the transactions will be protected from
fluctuating, unexpectedly high on-chain transaction fees. In
fact, a transaction fee can be 0 (zero) if the peers agree so.
Thus, for a well-defined channel between honest peers, there
will be two on-chain transactions: one to establish the channel
and one to close (finalize) the channel.
A B
Channel Cap = 200
A
B
2-of-2
multi-sig
100
100
Tx = 50
100 100
A B
50 150
Tx = 50
A B
0 200
Tx = 130
A B
130 70
A
B
2-of-2
multi-sig
130
70
Time=0
Fig. 1: Illustration of a payment channel.
An important feature of such a channel is that the direction
of the payments matter. Specifically, two flows from opposite
directions on the same link negate each other’s capacity
consumption. This is shown in Fig. 1. At Time=0, a channel
between two parties A and B is established. Both A and B
put 100 unit of currency which in turn makes the channel
capacity 200 units. After A makes 2 transactions each of which
is 50 units, the directional capacity from A to B will be zero.
Hence, A can not transfer any more unless B transfers back
some money. B sends 130 unit back and after they close the
channel they get their corresponding shares from the multi-
signature address.
C. Payment Channel Networks
Off-chain payment channels can be extended to a payment
channel network idea. As shown in Fig. 2, assume that A
and B have a channel, and B and C have a channel too. If
somehow, A wants to trade with C only, what s/he has to do
is hash-lock a certain amount of money and forward it to C
through B. As C already knows the answer to the challenge,
C will get her/his money from B by disclosing the answer.
The brilliance of the HTLC appears here. As C discloses the
answer to the challenge, B learns the answer. Now, B will
reply to the challenge successfully and get her/his share from
A. In this way, one can reach everyone in a network through
multi-hop payments forming a payment channel network.
A payment channel network illustrated in Fig. 2 consists
of three types of nodes in terms of functionality; end-user,
gateway, and routing nodes:
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Fig. 2: Payment channel network.
• End-user: An end-user usually makes payment to pur-
chase an item and rarely receives payment such as refund.
S/He connects to a gateway to access the rest of the
network. S/He needs to maintain certain amount of funds
in his/her channel with the gateway to continue sending
payments. S/He should open the channel with the best
gateway that can connect him to others continuously
and cheaply. The best choice would be connecting to a
gateway that s/he will usually have direct transactions.
• Gateway nodes: This type of nodes are usually the stores
that expect to receive payments in cryptocurrency. They
also relay the payments of their end-users’ payments to
other nodes. Gateway nodes should connect to routing
nodes with good connectivity. They may not aim to
earn transfer fees. Their primary purpose is to sell their
products in cryptocurrency.
• Routing nodes: These nodes typically act as backbone
routers (similar to BGP routers on Internet) to connect
gateways. They regard having a node in LN as an
investment opportunity. They try to have high number
of connections and maintain the channels well balanced.
This makes them a hub point in the network and lure
the transactions so that they increase the return of their
investments.
D. Assumptions
In this paper, we consider that a payment channel network
consists of nodes connected with off-chain payment channels.
The channel capacity represents the amount of money de-
posited in a 2-of-2 multi-signature address. Although any node
can send to and receive payment from any other node, we
want to distinguish nodes as end-users, gateways and routing
nodes since we want to simulate the case that people want to
use cryptocurrency for shopping and micropayment where the
cash flow is mostly from a customer to a gateway (a store in
real life). After a person establishes a payment channel with a
gateway, she can make a payment to anybody in the network.
We build up our work on a presumed existing routing
protocol (similar to LN’s) which is used by the nodes to
advertise the weights to the rest of the network and carry a
specified payment from a source to destination. We are not
focusing on the efficiency and overhead of the routing protocol
as our goal is to determine the gateway to start the payment.
Each node is assumed to know the complete topology to
calculate the path, and the updates about the channels are
propagated to other nodes in the network.
We would like to note that our approach is designed to
be used in any payment channel network. While we use LN
as an example to explain some concepts and problems, the
proposed approach is not specifically designed to work solely
within LN.
IV. PROPOSED APPROACH
A. Problem Motivation and Overview
In a payment channel network, an end-user transfers a
payment to a store by initiating the payment via a gateway.
This payment first goes through the gateway, then routing
nodes and arrives at the destination unless there is a direct
channel between the end-user and the gateway. This multi-
hop transmission may not be completed because of insufficient
funds in the channels. The funds in channels may shift to one
particular side of the channels if the payments are highly direc-
tional. While routing nodes may not suffer dramatically from
this type of problem because of high number of transactions
and well balanced channels, the gateway nodes are particularly
prone to channel balance exhaustion.
0 100
End user
Gateway S
0 100
End user
Gateway D
Routing
Node
Fig. 3: Depleted channels cause disconnection.
This is because, if a gateway has used up its outgoing
capacity, then it can not initiate any payment and function as
a transit node unless it receives some payment. Suppose that a
store is having a busy day and receiving many payments. The
channel between the store (gateway) and a routing node will
be depleted and the store will not be able to receive payments
anymore. This is depicted as an example in Fig. 3. In this
figure, the end-users connected to Gateway S can not make
payments through this node as its outgoing channel capacity is
0. They have to wait for Gateway S to receive some payments
destined to it. Similarly, if a gateway consumed all of its
incoming capacity, then it can not receive any payment and
function as a transit node as well until it is used to send some
payment. In Fig. 3, Gateway D can not receive any payment
since the incoming channel capacity is 0. It has to wait for
any end-user to send payments originating from D.
Our motivation to address this issue comes from the fact
that in payment channel networks, a payment can be initiated
from various points. Therefore, this can be an opportunity
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to balance the channels. Specifically, although we may not
control the destinations of the payments, we can influence the
initial gateway connection points for users. For example, a
node receiving a high volume of payments should also be
preferred as the source, and a node which has less outgoing
capacity should be avoided to originate payments. In this way,
the channels can be re-balanced with the help of cooperative
end-user node implementation.
Fig. 4: Success rate vs amount of the payment [20].
Another problem with current LN implementation is that it
only allows atomic payments, which means that there must be
a wide enough single channel to carry a payment from source
to destination. In such a system, large payments will cause ma-
jor shift in channel capacities which might inhibit the success
of the transactions in the overall system. The results of the
experiment shown in Fig. 4 performed by [20] indicates that
success rate decreases dramatically with increasing transfer
amount. We argue that multiple paths consisting of multiple
small channels might better satisfy a larger transaction amount
when split payments are allowed.
So in summary, our approach utilizes smart gateway selec-
tion and split payments to improve the overall success rate for
the transactions in payment channel networks. Next, we detail
these ideas.
B. Smart Gateway Selection
We propose a gateway selection method that utilizes mul-
tiple connections effectively between the end-user and the
gateway to create a more stable network. This method focuses
on the balances of the gateway channels and strive to keep
them balanced both inward and outward. The rationale is
balancing incoming and outgoing payments amounts for the
gateways so that they are not blocked from sending or receiv-
ing future payments. Therefore, we refer to this as Gateway
Inbound/Outbound Ratio approach.
The algorithm presented in Alg.1 calculates the total in-
bound and outbound capacity for each connected gateway,
and then it finds the one (gateway) with the lowest ratio.
Basically, the inbound/outbound ratio is used as the metric
when choosing the gateway to initiate the payment. Since we
are using single payment method, the links which do not have
enough capacity to transmit the amount is not considered in
path computation. If any of the gateway does not have the
required capacity, that is ruled out in the path calculation
either. When the gateway is decided, the transaction process
starts.
Algorithm 1 Inbound/Outbound Ratio
1: Input: C=Gateway list, G=Connected directed graph
2: for each directed edge, (u, v), in G do
3: weight(u, v)=bal(v, u)/[bal(u, v)+bal(v, u)]
4: end for // weight calculations are done
5: max = Integer.Min
6: for every gateway connection, s in C do // Find the
gateway with highest inbound/outbound ratio
7: total in = total out = 0
8: for every channel, (x, y), of gateway s do
9: total in = total in + capacity(y, x)
10: total out = total out + capacity(x, y)
11: end for
12: ratio = total in / total out
13: if ratio larger than max then
14: max = ratio
15: end if
16: end for
17: Path=ShortestPath(G, from=max, to=d)
18: Output: Path
C. Split Payments
In order to further increase the success rate for transactions,
we also explore various models for splitting the payments.
The ability to split a payment might allow big amounts to
be transferred by using multiple gateways if a single path is
not enough to carry the totality of a transaction. That should
increase the success rate and help manage the balances over
channels better.
A payment can be split in many ways, such as dividing
into very small units (i.e., micropayments) or equal bigger
chunks and these can be split among multiple gateways. Each
of these ways can be applied simultaneously along with the
smart gateway selection method we described earlier. These
methods might incur additional transaction costs depending
on the fee policy. For instance, if there is a base fee for each
transaction, micropayment model will be infeasible. In this
paper, we design two different splitting models as detailed
below:
Equal Share: In this model, the payment request is divided
among the gateways in equal shares if they all are capable
of transferring that amount. We first check if there is enough
total capacity from all connected gateways to the destination
using multiple-source single-sink max-flow algorithm [21]. It
is modified from max-flow algorithm by adding one extra
node to the network which is connected to all gateways with
unrestricted channel capacity. If the calculated capacity is not
enough, splitting also does not help to perform the transfer
because basically there is no route for transferring this amount.
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If we find out that a sufficient capacity exists, then we
divide the payment into multiple chunks based on the number
of available connections of the end user. We do not consider
any criteria of the gateways such as total capacity, fee or
ratio. All the gateways will forward equal amounts if possible.
However, if any of them does not have enough capacity,
then others will have to carry more to compensate for the
remaining amounts. The idea is utilizing the channels fairly
by distributing the payments among the gateways as much as
possible.
Proportional Split: In this split method, we consider a split
criterion based on the gateways’ inbound/outband ratios in-
stead of the number of gateways. Basically, we still check if
there is enough capacity to carry the payment from source
to the destination. However, this time, the total amount is
divided proportional to inbound/outbound ratio of the gate-
ways if possible. Specifically, the gateway with less outbound
capacity compared to inbound capacity transfers less amount
of transactions. This method should help the gateways better
to stay balanced especially for the existence of large payments.
Note that this method is also in line with our gateway selec-
tion approach in the previous section as they both consider the
same criterion. Thus, we expect that this splitting will further
improve the performance in terms of success rate.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section presents the experiment setup and results for
the proposed approach.
A. Experiment Setup
We developed a payment channel network simulator in Java
that allows us to run the experiments and measure the defined
metrics. We list the necessary parameters in Table I to set
when running the experiments.
TABLE I: Experiment Parameters
Number of Nodes 100
Degree of a Node 3
Initial Channel Capacities 50 to 150
Payment Amount 5 to 85
Number of Payment 5K
Network configuration: The results are based on a random
regular network with 100 nodes, each with degree 3. The
channels between the nodes are assigned a random capacity
uniformly distributed between 50 and 150.
Payment files: We build different payment sequences con-
sisting of 5000 end-to-end transactions. Each node sends and
receives 50 transactions on average. Each transaction amount
is selected randomly during the experiment within a specified
range. Source and destination are not necessarily the same
which means that node A transmits to B but may receive
from C.
Payment transfer: Each node calculates the path using
specified method and the payment is sent through intermediate
nodes by decrementing the amount from each channel used
and incrementing in the opposite direction. In the first set of
experiment, we use only single payment while in the second
part we use split payment.
Experiment run: Each payment file is run with various seeds
which randomized the initial channel capacity and payment
amount. Thus, the results are aggregate of 75 randomized tests
on the network.
B. Performance Metrics
We use the following metrics to assess the performance of
the proposed approach:
• Average success rate: This metric shows the average of
the number of payments that could be sent successfully
from a source to destination for the whole network.
• Fee: This is the total amount of fees that an end-user
has to pay to node owners on the path to destination.
Note that in our experiments, the fees are calculated
proportional to transfer amount at each hop without a
base fee. Obviously, actual fee depends on market value
and policy of the underlying payment network.
• Network imbalance: This metric measures the capacity
difference between two directions on a channel. We
use the average for the network to show the overall
imbalance.
• Hop count: This is the number of hops that an actual
payment has traveled when the payment is executed. This
could be important if there is a base fee or any delay
coming from intermediate nodes.
C. Benchmarks
In order to compare our proposed approach (designated as
in/out ratio in the graphs), we implemented the following
approaches as baselines. In all of these baseline algorithms
, we assume that the channel weights (fees) are updated as
described in our proposed algorithm. Thus, the only difference
is the way that they choose the gateway.
• Greedy approach: In greedy approach, the shortest path
is computed from connected gateways to the destination
in terms of weight, and minimum path among those is
selected. The user behaves selfish to minimize the trans-
action fee. It does not consider either available capacity
of the path or the imbalance problem over channels. For
instance, if there is one hop path with low capacity, that
will be selected to minimize the fee.
• Maximum flow: This is a general approach adopted by
various applications for this type of problems. In this
method, instead of choosing the low-cost path in a selfish
way, the maximum flow from each gateway to destination
is calculated using Ford-Fulkerson flow algorithm [22].
Then, the approach uses the path with highest channel
capacity. The idea is leaving available funds in the
channels after making a transaction so that upcoming
payments will have higher chances to find a proper path.
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Fig. 5: Experiment Results for Success Rate
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Fig. 6: Experiment Results for other factors
D. Experiment Results
In the first batch of the experiments, we compare greedy,
max-flow and in/out ratio methods when they are using single
payments. The success rates are reported in Fig.5 while other
metrics are reported in Fig.6. These results are the average
of various imbalance rate and with payment amounts varying
between 25 and 35.
1) Success Rate Results: Looking at the success rate with
respect to the number of user connection, we observe that
each method is performing better with higher number of
connections to gateways as it increases the chances of having a
route to any destination in the network. Having higher number
of connections means holding more money in the channels for
end-users. Based on the results, there is a diminishing return
for excessive connections after three. The greedy approach
performs worst in terms of overall performance of the network
while it provides cheapest transaction cost for successful
payments as will be seen in Fig. 6. One reason for lower
performance is that it consumes the channel funds selfishly
without taking higher balanced routes into consideration. That
causes huge skewness in channels as seen in Fig. 6c. The max-
flow method chooses a gateway with higher total capacity to
destination to send the payment which yields better perfor-
mance compared to the first one since utilizing wider paths
will leave space for possible upcoming payments that might
use the common channels. However, it incurs higher fee per
transaction as seen in Fig. 6a. Our proposed approach gives
the best success rate among all. This is because, it focuses
on keeping the gateways open for end-users. It is easier to
find a path in the inner part of the network if the payment
can go through source and destination gateways . With the
current setup, success rate with 5 connections reaches almost
100% with around 30% higher fee than the greedy method. It
also keeps the channels equally balanced in both directions as
seen in Fig. 6c which helps the network to stay stable. Given
that the fees in payment channel networks are much lower
compared to blockchain networks, a small increase in the fees
for almost guaranteeing all the transactions is a reasonable
price.
We then looked at the impact of payment amount on the
success rate as shown in Fig. 5b. We observe that all the
methods are suffering when the amount is increasing because
it becomes harder to find a path. However, our approach still
significantly outperforms others. The gap even increases with
the increased payment amounts.
Finally, we looked at the imbalance rate which also effects
the success rate significantly. Fig.5c shows that after a 40%
imbalance rate, our approach stands out to still maintain high
success rate. Again the reason behind this is its ability to look
for paths that will minimally impact the channel capacities.
2) Impact on other Metrics: Next, we assessed the impact
of the proposed approach on the other metrics such as fee,
hop count and network imbalance.
Fig.6a compares the relative transaction fees for the pro-
posed methods. Increasing number of connections reduces the
fee since there will be shorter paths. The fee in greedy method
decreases linearly because it always chooses the cheapest
route, and extra connections will provide better options in this
respect. On the other hand, it stays steady for our approach
after a certain point because we try to assign payments based
on gateway channel balances. Note that based on the actual
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Fig. 7: Experiment results for split payments.
fee, the difference between the methods may not be very
significant.
Fig. 6b shows number of hops that a payment has to travel
to arrive at the destination. The trends are similar to fee results
since the fee is directly related to number of hops it has to
travel. Average number of hops is also related to degree of the
nodes which is set as three in our test network.
In Fig. 6c, we quantify the channel imbalance which ba-
sically shows the difference between inbound and outbound
capacities in the channels. The difference should be kept
lower so that the payments can be transferred from both
ways. The greedy method makes the network suffer from
imbalance problem and causes higher number of failures while
our method method relieves it especially after 5 connections.
The improvement over geed and even max flow is significant.
3) Results for Split Payments: In a separate experiment,
we present the success rate results of split payment solutions
by comparing it with previous(without split) methods for
varying payment amounts and connections. Specifically, two
split methods are implemented: equal split that distributes
the payment among connected gateways by dividing into
equal amounts to assign to gateways, and ratio proportional
split that divides the payment based on the inbound/outbound
ratio. Thus, there are four approaches we compare: 1) greedy
approach without splitting (greedy - no split); 2) our approach
without splitting (in/out ratio - no split); 3) equal split (equal
split); and 4) ratio proportional split (in/out ratio proportional
split).
In Fig. 7a, we varied the payment amount from 20 to 80 to
observe the success rate of each approach. As can be seen,
for smaller amounts, splitting does not have much impact
on the results. However, with increasing transaction amounts
the difference becomes obvious. For both split methods, the
success rates are decreasing linearly while those of single ones
are decreasing much faster. Our proposed ratio proportional
splitting performs the best. It beats the no-split version of
the same approach significantly especially when the payment
amount increases. In addition, the equal splitting is better than
the greedy approach with no splitting in any case because it
distributes the payments to all connected gateways.
When we look at the fees shown in Fig. 7b, the difference
is not significant and the trends are similar. It should be noted
that we do not apply any base fee. If there is a base fee in
payment channel network design, then splitting might cost
more in proportional to the number of splits. In that case,
micro payments (splitting payment into tiny amounts) will not
be advantageous.
Fig. 7c shows the success rate against the number of
connections. We applied a payment amount between 75-85 in
this experiment. Again our approach with ratio proportional
splitting is the best. We also observe that when there is more
than five connections, our approach with no splitting does
better than equal splitting. This is because, there is now enough
connections to gateways that provides a natural splitting effect.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a smart gateway selection
method for end-users in a payment channel networks to send
their payments in order to improve the success rate of these
payments. We then provided split methods to further increase
this success rate. We investigated the effectiveness of the
proposed methods by comparing them with two common
approaches with extensive experiment analysis. The results
indicated the effectiveness of our gateway selection and split
methods in achieving high success rates.
For these results, we observed that keeping the gateways
open in terms of channel balance to send and receive payments
is an important objective which can be achieved by considering
inbound and outbound capacity balance. Split payment is also
a effective especially for higher amounts of payments.
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